Chapter 8: Political representation

In all five countries, Roma are underrepresented at all levels of government. The survey therefore paid special attention to questions of trusted intermediaries and patterns of political representation.

One important dimension of political representation was the role of intermediaries. What is the role of NGOs, political parties (both Roma and those of the majority)? Do the Roma trust them? What is the role of informal Roma leaders in this regard?

Another important dimension was related to representation at different levels of government. What is the level of government most trusted by the people? Which are the preferred political parties - ethnic to based or majority parties?



The role of intermediaries

The roles that local Roma elites can play (and are expected to play) in the development of Roma communities depends on the trust and support they receive from their constituencies. Most development projects are based on the assumption that informal Roma leaders are influential in their communities, and they should play a strategic role as active "agents of change" and intermediaries.

Reality is often more complicated than this. Local elites often play decisive roles in Roma communities, but these roles are not necessarily beneficial. The definition of "elite" status may also be problematic, as material position does not always translate into leadership roles. Data produced by the UNDP/ILO survey (shown in Table 14) indicate that, for many Roma communities, well to off Roma individuals are a "last resort" for support in all the countries (except in Bulgaria). While informal leaders are not the most important intermediaries in this regard, they do play a larger role than well to off Roma in this respect. This distinction suggests that a "class to type solidarity" may be emerging within Roma communities, reflecting the wealth-poverty cleavage. 120



Source: UNDP/ILO regional survey. Options are responses to the question, On whom can Roma in your country rely for support? Respondents were asked to choose ‘rather yes’ or ‘rather no’ for each option. The table shows the percentage of ‘yes’ answers for each option.

This emerging division along the wealth/poverty cleavage has major implications for donors developing projects targeted at Roma communities. Many of these projects rely on the active involvement of local leaders. Unfortunately, donors do not always properly assess the credibility of these leaders before beginning projects. Too often donors are not sufficiently sensitive to internal community stratification, exploitation, and misuse of resources by "family to based" instead of "community-based" NGOs. These problems can prevent projects from benefiting communities on the whole. The fact that local Roma leaders enjoy less credibility than friends and neighbours, from both Roma and majority communities-and even the government itself-offers further confirmation of this point.

The credibility of other "traditional" intermediaries also seems to be low. Data summarized in Graph 34 show that NGOs are among the least trusted intermediaries. 121 Only in the Czech Republic does the level of trust in NGOs reach 19 percent of the respondents. In all other countries, it ranges between 5 percent in Romania and 10 percent in Slovak Republic. This low confidence in Roma NGOs suggests that the potential benefits of not to for to profit activities are not being fully realized in many Roma communities. This may result from confusion between "NGO activities," "political parties," and "business"-a confusion that could open the way for corruption. The agendas of such organizations can correspond to narrow family interests. As a result, donor support for a given Roma NGO can unintentionally mean support for a single Roma family or group, support that can polarize communities.


Political representation

The CEE countries have had various experiences with Roma political parties and their representation in parliaments, which are described in detail in the UNDP national reports. One common feature may be that non-Roma parties of both the left and right have viewed the Roma electorate as something worth pursuing. Despite their social exclusion, Roma voters participate in national elections. As the data in Graph 35 show, Roma turnout runs between 60 percent and 80 percent in four of the five CEE countries. The Bulgarian and Hungarian cases are interesting in this regard: Roma voter turnout in these countries was even higher than the share of the Roma respondents declaring their trust in political parties, Roma or other. 122 This may result from the small role of Roma political officials at all levels, and generate more apathetic views toward politics. This lack of representation, however, has not yet lead to Roma non to participation in elections.

Roma elites in the CEE region are generally characterized by political fragmentation and the absence of common political strategies. This may be one of the reasons why Roma usually vote for other (majority) political parties in national elections. But after having captured Roma votes in elections, these parties often forget about Roma concerns. Minimal electoral thresholds for entering parliament are another common problem. Since Roma voters constitute relatively small shares of electorates, even strong Roma support for a single national Roma party would not guarantee that party the votes needed for parliamentary representation. This fact works against the formation of national Roma parties. 123

Box 17: Roma political parties in Slovakia

In March 1990, representatives of Roma intelligentsia registered at the Ministry of Interior the Roma Civic Initiative (ROI), a Roma political party on a nationwide basis. In June 1990, the ROI ran in the first free and democratic parliamentary elections following more than 40 years of Communist rule; in the Czech Republic it did so in coalition with the Civic Forum, in Slovak Republic it teamed up with the Public Against Violence, respective political movements that played an instrumental role in bringing down the Communist regime. The ROI obtained four seats in the Czechoslovak federal parliament, and one mandate in the Slovak National Council, Slovakia's national parliament. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, Roma appeared also on a candidates' list of the Communist Party of Slovak Republic (KSS, later transformed into the Party of Democratic Left, or SD). In the course of 1990, the political activity of Roma in Czechoslovakia bloomed and many new Roma associations, cultural organizations and political parties were established. As a result, the Roma movement began to splinter more and more, dissipating its political weight. In 1992 ROI decided to run in the parliamentary elections as an independent political party but failed receiving only 0.53 percent of votes.

After the Slovak Republic became independent, the Roma Civic Initiative (ROI) remained the most important and influential Roma political entity. Apart from the ROI, a number of other Roma political parties kept emerging, but their influence was and remains irrelevant, since most of them fail to go beyond a regional or even local importance. Currently there are more than 15 registered Roma political parties in the country.

In early 1998, Roma politicians strove to unite Roma political parties in Slovakia. But after several unsuccessful negotiations, the Roma leaders parted ways. In the 1998 parliamentary elections no Roma political party ran independently. In the municipal elections of December 1998, Roma were featured mostly on the candidate lists of the ROI and the RIS (Roma Intelligentsia for Coexistence), and ran as independent candidates, but they also appeared on the HZDS, SDK, SDL, KSS, SMK and the Association of Slovak Workers (ZRS) party lists. After the 1998 municipal elections, a total of 56 Roma were elected as deputies and six Roma candidates became mayors of municipalities or city districts.

At the beginning of September 1999, representatives of 14 Roma political parties established the Coalition Council of Roma Political Parties. In October 2000, 14 Roma political parties and 37 Roma NGOs signed an agreement on a joint strategy for the 2002 parliamentary elections. The agreement (the most remarkable achievement so far in Roma political unification) states that all Roma political parties will team up behind the ROI, the oldest and most consolidated Roma political party. Joint action however was not achieved in practice and two Roma political parties (ROI leaded by Milan Šcuka and ROMA led by Ladislav Fízik) ran independently in October 2002 parliamentary elections. Both failed receiving respectively 8420 votes (0,29 percent) and 6234 votes (0,21 percent). RIS (leaded by Alexander Patkoló) signed an agreement with the HZDS of Vladimír Meciar and was offered 75th place on the candidacy list. As a result there is no Roma MP in the National Council of the Slovak Republic.

The greatest political obstacle for the Roma is the 5 percent threshold for entering the Parliament. Given the number of Roma in Slovakia and their demographic characteristics (i.e. the high proportion of children under 18 and their low literacy rate), it appears almost impossible for even a single Roma party to cross the 5 percent threshold for parliamentary representation.

Box prepared by Michal Vašecka, Institute for Public Affairs, Bratislava, Slovakia.


There are better opportunities for local level Roma political participation and representation in regions or municipalities where Roma electorates are substantial. The most promising level of political representation (and the most trusted, according to the UNDP/ILO survey data) is not surprisingly local government. This is also the level at which people feel their interests are best represented, as is shown in Graph 36. This sentiment could promote broader inclusion of Roma in local government and politics. Moreover, the UNDP/ILO survey revealed high levels of "local level political awareness" among Roma respondents. When asked to name the local mayor, most respondents did so correctly. 124 Awareness was highest in Hungary (88 percent of respondents could name their mayor), followed by Slovak Republic (80 percent), Romania (78 percent), and Bulgaria (62 percent). Only in the Czech Republic did the share of correct answers to this question fall to 30 percent.

The answers to the question, Who best defends your interests in your community? reveal major tensions in Roma attitudes about the representation of their interests (see Graph 37). Despite being underrepresented at various levels of government, most respondents expect support from state institutions, particularly social assistance agencies and local government bodies. The responses to this question also suggest that, despite low levels of trust in informal leaders, Roma still expect these leaders, rather than Roma NGOs or Roma political parties, to defend their interests. Tensions are also apparent in the survey data on the extent of interactions with majority communities. 125 As is seen in Table 15, the intensity of interactions with majority communities (reflected in responses to the question, What type of interactions with the majority do you have?) is correlated with the feeling of "being represented." This suggests that Roma inclusion and equal representation go hand in hand with interactions with majority communities. The extent to which this message is understood and internalized by Roma and majority communities remains an open question.



Source: UNDP/ILO regional survey. Responses based on the question, Do you think your interests are represented well enough? broken down by major groups. The numbers represent percentages of the respondents with different intensity of common practices with majority who feel their interests are represented at the respective level of government.


The meaning of equal rights and opportunities

The UNDP/ILO survey approached issues of opportunities and equal rights for Roma from various angles. Respondents were asked to compare their life chances and opportunities with those of majority communities. They were also queried about the most important objective determinants of successful integration. When asked, Which pre to conditions are the most important for ensuring that your human rights are respected?, respondents generally pointed to such socio-economic options as 'To live life free of hunger,' 'To be able to find a job,' and 'To have the same living standards as the rest of the people in the country' (Table 16). The same emphasis on economic considerations appears in responses to the question, What do you think is of primary importance for Roma to become equal members of the society? (Table 17). In both cases respondents ranked issues of 'primary' and 'secondary' importance. Table 16 and 17 show these rankings, based on the frequencies of 'primary importance' indicated for each option. 126

As can be seen from the tables, employment and freedom from poverty are unambiguously perceived as the precondition for equality. The second most important precondition (receiving equal support in all five countries) is involvement in government, especially at the local level (represented by the options 'To be equally represented at all levels of state administration' and 'to participate in the state administration at local levels'). The second most important precondition is political representation, 'Roma party capable of entering the Parliament.' These issues are perceived as even more important than having government ministers who are Roma. Creating Roma newspapers or TV channels seems to be relatively unimportant. The option, 'To live together with the majority but not as part of the majority' was ranked highly as a precondition for equal participation in four of the five CEE countries (with Romania the exception).



Source: UNDP/ILO regional survey. Based on responses to the question, Which preconditions are the most important for ensuring that your human rights are respected? 1- most important, 8 - least important.



Source: UNDP/ILO regional survey. Based on responses to the question, What is of primary significance for Roma to become equal members of the society? 1- at primary significance

Questions of social inclusion and intensity of minority to majority interactions are part of what might be described as "integration trade to offs"-the degree to which the integration of minority groups into majority cultures occurs at the expense of their distinctiveness and identity. While protecting minority cultures is an important dimension of basic human rights, problems arise when "distinctiveness protection costs" are present. When these costs are covered by social redistributive systems (taxation and social safety nets), majority communities must be aware of and support this protection. If such support is lacking, the door is open to the exclusion and potentially violent rejection of cultural diversity.

Analyses and programmes that focus on the prevention of Roma human rights violations have not always afforded adequate attention to this crucial question. This approach focuses on constructing the legal framework needed to protect individual and collective rights. Substantial progress has been achieved during the last decade in this regard, making possible the adoption and subsequent ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities by all five CEE countries. Questions of enforcement and generating the necessary political support-among majority communities-for this legal framework have now come to the fore.

This support can only be attained if both majority and Roma communities come to perceive their joint interests. In terms of Roma development opportunities, this means communicating to both communities the contributions that Roma can make to European societies, and explaining what needs to be done in order to utilize this potential. As was pointed out in the "Demography" chapter, high Roma birth rates could be both a problem and an opportunity for aging European societies. The same applies to other aspects of Roma culture, such as the ability to enjoy life, to be grateful for even modest improvements (a trait that is vanishing in consumer societies), the highest respect for freedom and independence, for flexibility and adaptation, and for internal mobility. In the current setting, all these attributes are latent assets-provided they are understood in a clear development perspective. It is only within such a perspective that current obstacles can be transformed into benefits.

Since the five countries covered in this report are in the process of EU accession, they have unique opportunities to convert the negative attributes often associated with the Roma into positive characteristics. The desire to meet the accession criteria can provide governments with strong incentives to take action on Roma issues. All five countries have established the necessary institutional structures related to ethnic issues, and they have signed and ratified most of the international instruments related to human rights and the protection of minorities (see Table E7 in Annex 3). However, while all five countries have advisory bodies at the central level (affiliated with the council of ministers) and most countries have parallel bodies operating at the sectoral and local levels, few of these bodies have executive prerogatives. In some countries the focus of these bodies is in practice limited to the demographic and social aspects of Roma questions.

As the overview to these questions in Annex 4 shows, institutional structures are in place, the political will is there (or at least has been declared), and there are funds available to finance Roma to related initiatives. Two major factors have to date prevented the introduction of effective policies to address these issues. The first has been the lack of an internally consistent conception of what to do and how to do it. In particular, a detailed human development approach to Roma issues has not, until now, been articulated. The second and related factor has been inadequate administrative and policymaking capacity in those agencies that would have to execute a strategy based on the human development approach to Roma issues. Concerted efforts by governments, NGOs, and international donors are needed to address both obstacles.


Main conclusions of Chapter 8

The survey did not support some of the research team's hypotheses. Neither Roma NGOs, nor Roma political parties enjoy significant levels of trust from Roma communities. Roma also seem to have little trust in non-Roma NGOs. These low levels of trust seem to reflect the perceptions that these actors have not made significant contributions to Roma development opportunities. They also suggest that many Roma do not feel well represented by their "leaders" or by institutions that provide assistance. The survey data indicate that Roma believe that their interests are not sufficiently represented at virtually all levels of government. But despite this perception of under to representation, most Roma expect support from state institutions, particularly from social assistance agencies and municipalities. Although Roma feel under to represented at all levels of government, respondents in all five countries indicated that their interests are better represented at local than at central levels of government.

The survey revealed high levels of "local political awareness." Combined with weak support for national to level Roma parties, this suggests that participation at the local and community level should be given priority as feasible and sustainable instruments for Roma participation. This assumption is supported by the fact that many successful Roma projects are community to oriented, and involve community mobilization elements. At the same time, national to level representation should be promoted through changes in electoral mechanisms (i.e., reductions in percentage thresholds for parliamentary representation) to ensure the presence of minority interests in national policy to making.

Survey responses indicate that human rights are perceived predominantly through the development opportunity lens, rather than through its legal dimensions. Respondents unanimously perceive employment opportunities as the precondition for equality and integration. The second most important precondition is involvement in government, especially at local levels. Local level participation is perceived as more important than either participating in the central state administration, or having government ministers who are Roma.